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First Lessons from the Libya Operations 
Jo Coelmont 
In  this  Security  Policy  Brief,  Jo  Coelmont 
expresses his concern, if a comprehensive 
vision within the EU would remain absent. 
Operations  in  Libya  have  been  going  on  for 
some two weeks now. For military intervention 
to be successful, a number of rules of thumb 
must be respected. Absolute clarity about the 
military  tasks  and  about  the  Rules  of 
Engagement,  and  unity  of  command  are 
essential. The forces must possess all required 
capabilities  and  need  rapidly  deployable 
reserves so as to be able to deal with all possible 
contingencies. The civilian dimension demands 
equal clarity. At the political level, the ultimate 
objective,  the  desired  end-state,  must  be 
defined unambiguously, and be substantiated by 
a political roadmap. Military operations cannot 
achieve durable results unless they are part of a 
comprehensive  political  vision,  of  an  overall 
strategy. Finally the support of public opinion is 
needed, both at home and in theatre.  
 
Experience  teaches  that  if  any  item  (military, 
civilian  or  political)  from  the  above  list  is 
missing, failure is more probable than success. 
Vague declarations can temporarily obscure the 
real  state  of  affairs,  but  on  the  ground  only 
reality matters. Public opinion is quick to see 
through such statements in any case. What is 
presented  as  constructive  ambiguity  quickly 
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turns  out  to  be  destructive.  Clarity  is  an 
indispensable prerequisite, for public opinion 
and military planners alike.  
 
Room for Interpretation 
Every  crisis  has  its  own  characteristics.  The 
whole world – Europe, the direct neighbour 
included – was taken by surprise by the recent 
events  in  the  Arab  world  and  in  Libya  in 
particular. The speed and unity with which the 
international  community  spoke  out  against 
Gaddafi  was  striking.  But  it  hides  a  first 
ambiguity, for the consensus comprises both 
countries that seek to support the revolutions 
in  the  region  and  others  that  prefer  the 
stability of the status quo.  
 
UNSC 1970, which refers the issue of Libya to 
the  International  Criminal  Court,  fits  both 
options. More difficulties emerged in the next 
phase  however.  To  support  the  rebels’ 
progress, France and the UK pleaded for a no-
fly  zone.  That  would  only  have  made  sense 
though if the destruction of the fighting power 
of Gaddafi’s air force would have meant the 
end of his military superiority and his power 
base. If not, it would have made the countries 
enforcing the no-fly zone into silent witnesses 
of slaughter on the ground, like in Bosnia in 
the 1990s.  
 
For that reason, the no-fly zone is only one 
element  of  UNSC  1973,  next  to  an  arms 
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embargo  and,  most  importantly,  the 
authorization  “to  take  all  necessary  measures 
[…] to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack”. This goes much 
further  than  a  no-fly  zone  –  but  how  much 
further? Does it imply the complete destruction 
of  Gaddafi’s  military  capacity?  Can  close  air 
support  be  provided  to  the  rebel  forces  in 
contact  with  troops  loyal  to  Gaddafi?  Can 
foreign ground troops be deployed to protect 
civilians?  UNSC  1973  explicitly  forbids 
occupation forces. Technically speaking that are 
military  forces  that  remain  in  theatre  without 
specific combat tasks. Who follows that 
interpretation? And who is authorised to 
provide the forces for intervention? The 
Resolution leaves it to the Member States 
of  the  UN,  to  regional  organizations, 
and,  also,  to  ad  hoc  coalitions.  It  thus 
gives a de facto right of interpretation to 
those that intervene militarily.  
 
Many commentators equalled UNSC 1973 with 
a mandate to install a relatively innocent no-fly 
zone.  Little  wonder  that  its  concrete 
interpretation  quickly  puts  pressure  on  the 
lauded  international  solidarity  and  raises 
questions with public opinion.  
 
Lack of a Global Strategy  
Which  lessons  can  be  drawn  from  the  initial 
phase of crisis management? Militarily speaking, 
the  first  weeks  of  operations  have b e e n  
successful. France, the UK and especially the 
US  quickly  assembled  the  required  military 
means to neutralize Gaddafi ’s air defences, the 
assault on Benghazi was forestalled, and a no-
fly  zone  was  set  up.  Command  and  control 
structures  for  the  conduct  of  the  operation 
were improvised. The US in any case did not 
want  to  take  the  lead  and  was  looking  to 
Europe.  Although  the  US  and  European 
countries intervened together, the transatlantic 
political dialogue did not take place in NATO, 
but between the capitals of the willing nations. 
The  political  direction  of  the  military 
operations will continue to be decided upon at 
that level, through an ad hoc “contact group”. 
NATO, whose flag is not everywhere equally 
welcome,  has  been  assigned  the  technical, 
executive functions of the military conduct of 
the  operations.  The  military  tasks  vary  from 
one country to another: from embargo, to no-
fly-zone, to protection of civilians, for the time 
being with air forces and missiles only. As for 
the  deployment  of  ground  forces,  several 
options  are  being  kept  open.  How  long 
operations will last, is not clear.  
“When  operations  started,  there 
was a desired political end-state, 
Gaddafi’s departure, but no clear 
political roadmap to reach it” 
Politically, the EU is less divided this time than 
over the invasion of Iraq. But there is far from 
complete  agreement.  Initially  France  and  the 
UK were taking the lead; some countries, such 
as  Belgium,  were  following  immediately; 
others,  such  as  Germany,  were  abstaining. 
Contrary to other crises in the past, reaction 
has been relatively quick. But far from being 
preventive,  the  intervention  nearly  came  too 
late.  When  operations  started,  there  was  a 
desired political end-state, Gaddafi’s departure, 
but  no  clear  political  roadmap  to  reach  it. 
Nothing  had  been  elaborated  in  terms  of  a 
long-term  solution  after  the  military  phase, 
neither for Libya nor for the region. And even 
now,  after  the  London  conference,  all  this 
remains pretty much “work in progress”.  
 
All indications point in the same direction: a 
lack of common approach based on an overall 
strategy. As the US is looking to Europe, the 
EU comes into the picture. Clearly, France and 
the  UK  alone  cannot  carry  the  military  and 
political  burden.  That  already  proved   3 
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impossible at the time of the civil war in former 
Yugoslavia, a fact which inspired Tony Blair and 
Jacques Chirac to create a security and defence 
policy  within  the  EU.  The  Iraq  crisis 
subsequently inspired the Convention to include 
the  required  institutional  instruments  in  the 
Treaty texts. Now our shortcomings in dealing 
with  the  Arab  revolutions  in  general  and  with 
the  Libyan  crisis  in  particular  must  stimulate 
Europe  to  improvise  less,  to  act  preventively, 
and to finally give substance to the objectives it 
committed to in the Lisbon Treaty. The needs 
range  from  more  structured  military 
cooperation, civilian and military structures for 
command and control – vital for each operation 
– to elaborating an overall political strategy for 
EU external action, with specific objectives for 
each region. Durable cooperation with the Arab 
world  must  take  place  with  the  EU,  which 
should  now  give  concrete  meaning  to  its  so-
called strategic partnerships.  
 
It  is  striking,  and  unfortunate,  that  again  it 
requires the US to point the EU into the right 
direction.  
 
Conclusion  
Europe  has  now  crossed  the  Rubicon  of 
engaging in a military intervention, the political 
direction  of  which  is  coming  its  way.  In  the 
immediate  future,  a  balance  must  be  sought 
between  a  minimal  military  footprint  and 
protection  of  civilians,  and  between  the 
interpretation to be given to UNSC 1973 and 
safeguarding  a  broad  consensus,  including 
notably  with  Arab  countries,  even  if  the 
military  phase  might  last  longer  and  become 
more  complex  than  hoped.  The  end-state  is 
what matters, not the end-date. Speeding up a 
positive conclusion can only be done trough a 
forceful  political  roadmap  with  a  clear  EU 
imprint. In a first phase, military intervention 
can be necessary to achieve the objectives. But 
without  a  political  framework,  intervention 
quickly becomes part of the problem. That too 
experience has taught us.  
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